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t the insistence of Germany, the member countries of the eurozone appear to have agreed to 
introduce a sovereign debt default mechanism. They even seem to be willing to codify this 
into a new treaty – an extraordinary step.  
My contention is that this is a very bad decision that will make the eurozone more fragile by 
making financial crises an endemic feature of the eurozone.  
Before presenting the argument, I want to make the point that the proposed sovereign debt default 
mechanism is based on a wrong diagnosis of the causes of the debt crisis in the eurozone. The 
purpose of the mechanism is to reduce the scope for moral hazard: by making it clear to investors 
that their investments in sovereign eurozone bonds are not guaranteed, these investors will apply 
more scrupulous risk analyses preventing irresponsible governments from issuing excessive debt. 
Thus, the proposed mechanism is based on the view that the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone is 
the result of irresponsible behaviour of governments that exploited the implicit bail-out guarantee 
while private investors had no incentive to discipline these governments.  
This interpretation of the source of the debt crisis in the eurozone has become popular mainly 
because it fits the Greek crisis well. It cannot, however, explain the debt crisis involving the other 
eurozone countries, where the root cause of the debt problems is to be found in the unsustainable 
debt accumulation of the private sectors. From 1999 until 2008, when the financial crises erupted, 
private households in the eurozone increased their debt levels from about 50% of GDP to 70%. The 
explosion of bank debt in the eurozone was even more spectacular and reached more than 250% of 
GDP in 2008. Surprisingly, the only sector that did not experience an increase in its debt level 
during that period was the government sector, which saw its debt decline from 72 to 68% of GDP. 
Ireland and Spain, two of the countries with the severest government debt problems today, 
experienced the strongest declines of their government debt ratios prior to the crisis. These are also 
the countries where the private debt accumulation was the strongest. 
After the crash of 2008, the private debt accumulation in the eurozone forced the governments of 
the eurozone countries to allow their own debt levels to increase. This was achieved through two 
channels. The first one consisted of governments actually taking over private debt (mostly bank 
debt). The second one operated through the automatic stabilisers set in motion by the recession-
induced decline in government revenues. As a result, the government debt-to-GDP ratios started 
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increasing very fast after the eruption of the financial crisis. This increase was necessary to save 
large segments of the private sector. It had nothing to do with irresponsible governments that failed 
to be disciplined by financial markets. The reverse is the truth. Financial markets were 
undisciplined and governments took their responsibility when they saved them.  
A sovereign debt default mechanism in the eurozone is not the appropriate response to the debt 
crisis in the eurozone because it is based on a wrong diagnosis of its origin. More importantly, its 
implementation is outright dangerous, and will make the eurozone more rather than less prone to 
financial crises. Let me elaborate on this point by introducing an analogy with the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) that existed in the EU prior to the start of the eurozone.  
The ERM was a fragile institutional arrangement that led to frequent crises. In the end it could not 
be sustained and disappeared. The reason for this fragility is well-known. The member countries of 
the ERM pegged their exchange rates among each other. The understanding, however, was that at 
any time they could reconsider this peg and devalue their currencies. The availability of this option 
to devalue their currencies created an unstable environment prone to speculative attacks. 
Sometimes, there were good reasons for the speculators to expect that one or more countries would 
devalue their currencies (e.g. because their wages and prices were out of line with the others). At 
other times these expectations of devaluation would drop out of the blue sky. Whatever the reason, 
once speculators expected a devaluation, a self-fulfilling dynamics would be set in motion, the end 
result of which would be that the country involved lost out. This dynamics always had the same 
ingredients: When speculators expected a devaluation, the central bank of the country concerned 
had to raise the domestic interest rate. The latter, however, was costly for the domestic economy 
and for the government budget. As a result, the cost-benefit ratio of keeping the exchange rate fixed 
increased, leading to a temptation to devalue. As speculators ‘smelled’ this, they intensified their 
speculative activities, leading to a further increase in the interest rate and a further deterioration of 
the cost-benefit ratio of keeping the exchange rate fixed. In most cases this made the devaluation 
inevitable. In the end the ERM collapsed. 
The proposed sovereign debt default mechanism introduces a similar incentive structure for 
speculators and national authorities as in the ERM. When the member countries of the eurozone 
solemnly announce (it will be solemn since it will be enshrined in the Treaty) that investors face 
governments that have the option to apply a haircut on outstanding bonds, two things will happen. 
First, as the perceived risk of these bonds will increase, the interest rate on these bonds is likely to 
go up. This is the effect that has been stressed by the President of the European Central Bank, Jean-
Claude Trichet. Defenders of the sovereign default mechanism counter this argument by claiming 
that such a system also gives the national governments stronger incentives to maintain discipline in 
budgetary matters. The recent increases in the government bond spreads since the announcement of 
the sovereign debt default mechanism seem to vindicate Trichet.  
The second problem, however, is much more serious. This is the ERM problem, which will also 
become the problem of the eurozone. When governments solemnly declare that in times of payment 
difficulties they will devalue the government bonds (that’s what a haircut means), this will 
introduce the speculative dynamics in the eurozone that destroyed the ERM. Once investors expect 
payment difficulties of a particular government, they will sell the bonds, thereby raising the interest 
rate on these bonds. This is exactly what speculators in the ERM did when they expected a 
devaluation of the currency: they sold the currency.  
This mechanism has already been triggered in the eurozone during the last year and a half, but it has 
been contained by the commitment of the other countries to provide financial assistance. The 
declared objective of the proposed sovereign debt default mechanism is to replace mutual financial 
assistance. As a result, it opens the gates for unrestrained ERM-type speculation. Once the option to 
devalue becomes the declared policy and replaces mutual financial assistance, the speculative 
dynamics will become unstoppable as it introduces exactly the same incentive structure as in the 
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their debt more difficult. This changes the cost-benefit ratio of maintaining full debt service and 
increases the temptation to devalue the bonds (applying a haircut). Investors ‘smelling’ this 
temptation will intensify their selling of sovereign bonds, thereby increasing the cost-benefit ratio 
even further.  
I do not want to argue that the proposed sovereign debt default mechanism transforms the eurozone 
into a system that is identical to the ERM system. Even with a sovereign debt default mechanism, 
the cost of default (devaluing the debt) in the eurozone is likely to remain higher than the cost of 
devaluing the currency in the ERM. Nevertheless, by making it easier to devalue sovereign debt, the 
eurozone moves in the direction of the unstable ERM incentive mechanism. Governments will have 
a higher incentive to devalue their debt when the sovereign debt default mechanism is in place than 
when it does not exist. And this can be sufficient for speculators to make a move.  
Thus, one should expect that the introduction of a sovereign debt default mechanism will make debt 
crises in the eurozone more frequent and more lethal. Whether the eurozone can survive such a 
structural increase in the frequency and intensity of debt crises remains to be seen. I suspect that, if 
applied, the sovereign debt default mechanism will destabilise the eurozone and ensure its demise.  
Under pressure from the German government, which is only concerned about its own reputation, 
the other eurozone governments seem to have accepted to do what sovereign governments should 
never do, i.e. to announce that they may debase their own debt. The sovereign debt default 
mechanism, if implemented, will lead the eurozone governments to downgrade their own sovereign 
debt. There is no surer path to self-destruction.  
It is paradoxical that so many today consider a sovereign debt default mechanism as the formula to 
avoid future debt crises in the eurozone. Its attractiveness is in my view due to the fact that it 
promises a solution to the debt problem without having to call upon a solidarity mechanism in the 
eurozone. Financial solidarity is deemed politically unacceptable in a number of countries. The 
truth, however, is that a monetary union can only survive if there is a willingness to provide mutual 
financial assistance in times of crisis. No monetary union can survive without such solidarity 
mechanism.  
The solution therefore is not to implement the sovereign debt default mechanism, which will lead to 
the demise of the eurozone, but to give a permanent character to the European Financial Stability 
Facility, or better to transform it into a European Monetary Fund along the lines suggested by Gros 
& Mayer (2010),
1 including strong enough conditionality so as to reduce the risk of moral hazard.  
                                                      
1 How to deal with sovereign default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund, Daniel Gros & Thomas Mayer, 
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